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AGAINST GRAND THEORIES: 
A (CAUTIONARY) TALE OF 
TWO DISCIPLINES
Abstract: In this paper, I  combine an
exposition of the historical development 
of sociology and the philosophy of science
from the era of grand theories onwards,
with an explication as to why the grand 
theories have failed. First, I  trace some
parallels in the history of each of the dis-
ciplines. After presenting their chrono-
logical development, I  scrutinize the
metatheoretical findings about the disci-
plines and examine the main ontological 
and epistemic reasons why attempts at 
these general theories or frameworks
have not succeeded. Among them are
the lack of a universal methodology and 
of a  theoretical core, together with the
impossibility of achieving a  common
objective view. On this basis I  conclude
that general theories or frameworks are
not achievable in principle. As it turns
out, however, some contemporary social 
theorists and philosophers still harbor 
hopes that they can be successfully 
formulated, or at the least do  not rule
out such a possibility. Thus, in closing,
I  argue that the critical points can also
be applied to these latest attempts, as the
call for grand theories or frameworks has
never ceased and returns regularly with
each new generation of social theorists
and philosophers of science.
Keywords: grand theory; metatheory 
in sociology; metaphilosophy of science;
structural functionalism; logical 
empiricism; relational and analytical 
sociology
Proti velkým teoriím: (varovný)
příběh dvou disciplín
Abstrakt: Tento článek kombinuje 
přehled historického vývoje sociologie 
a  filosofie vědy od  období „velkých“ 
teorií s  výkladem toho, proč tyto teorie 
selhaly. V  první části sleduji historické 
paralely v  obou těchto disciplínách. 
Po  představení jejich chronologického 
vývoje analyzuji metateoretické závěry, 
které z  toho vyplývají, a  zkoumám 
hlavní epistemické a ontologické důvody, 
proč neuspěly – mezi nimi chybějící 
univerzální metodologii a  teoretické 
jádro i nemožnost dosažení objektivního 
náhledu. Z toho vyvozuji závěr, že velké 
teorie nejsou principiálně zkonstruo-
vatelné. Ukazuje se nicméně, že někteří 
současní sociální teoretici i  filosofové 
vědy stále doufají, že takové teorie nebo 
rámce mohou být úspěšně formulovány, 
nebo přinejmenším takovou možnost 
nevylučují. V  závěru argumentuji, že 
kritika vznesená vůči těmto dřívějším 
teoriím může být uplatněna i na tyto ak-
tuální pokusy. Ukazuje se totiž, že volání 
po těchto teoriích a rámcích nikdy úplně 
nepřestalo a opakuje se s každou novou 
generací sociálních vědců a filosofů vědy.
Klíčová slova: velká teorie; metateorie 
v sociologii; metafi losofi e vědy; 
strukturální funkcionalismus; logický 






This paper contributes to the ongoing lively debate about a  general
theory (of any kind) in sociology or the philosophy of science. Although
recent attempts, which are mentioned towards the end of this text, are not as
audacious as previous ones, such as Parsons’s or Vienna and Berlin Circles’,
they still presume that a  general framework can be constructed. For that
reason, I not only review the history of these movements, but also present
contrary theoretical arguments with the broader aim of dispensing with
these continuing calls for holistic frameworks, which appear periodically in
both disciplines.
1. Heyday of the Grand Th eories1 – Structural Functionalism
and Logical Empiricism
In this fi rst section, I provide an overview of the emergence of grand theo-
retical systems both in sociology and the philosophy of science and of their
fortunes in later decades.
Although the subject matter of the disciplines is diff erent, their history 
reveals some striking similarities and parallels which still hold up. As sociol-
ogy and the philosophy of science have oft en crossed paths in the past, this
entanglement also helps to understand their developmental milestones and
explain the many blind alleys that they ran into. Comte, who stood at the
origin of both sociology and positivist philosophy, can serve as an exam-
ple of this nexus. But this affi  liation does not end here – a rich intellectual
exchange has oft en led to “cross-fertilizing,” in which the ideas from one
discipline infl uenced the other. In the next part, I will show that the threads
1  Historically, the term “grand theory” was introduced to sociology by Mills. It denotes the
theoretical system put forth by Talcott Parsons and his coworkers and is also occasionally used 
for other great theoretical systems in sociology. Although not so common in the philosophy of 
science (or studies of science), the term “grand theory” also refers to a great theoretical system
about science, such as “logical empiricism” or similar. Cf. Wright C. Mills, Th e Sociological 
Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); David Hull, “Testing Philosophical
Claims about Science,” in PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science
Association 1992: Symposia and Invited Papers, no. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), 468–75; Stathis Psillos and Martin Curd, “Introduction,” in Th e Routledge Companion
to the Philosophy of Science, eds. Stathis Psillos and Martin Curd (London: Routledge, 2008),
xix–xxvii. Th us, for the purpose of this article, by “grand theory” I mean any general frame-
work that aims to establish an entity (or set of entities), a methodology, or an approach, as
a (holistic) principle through which the social world can be understood, described, and ex-
plained. By analogy, in the philosophy of science, a grand theory suggests a universal frame-
work (base) for scientifi c theories, a general explanatory principle, or narrative through which
science can be viewed and described.
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entwined on more than one occasion, as the disciplines are related on a deep
epistemological level.
The late 1920s and 1930s were auspicious times for grand theories 
which attempted to give birth to a general framework for all-encompassing
theories of society, or science, respectively. In the 30s the possibility of such
grandiose undertakings was not disputed, and these programs were carried
out largely unquestioned for a number of years. They were usually welcomed
and displayed the unmatched self-confidence and optimistic prospects of 
these disciplines.
A prime specimen of a grand theory was structural functionalism, sug-
gested by Parsons and his coworkers. In their theory of social action and
AGIL, their ultimate goal was to create a conceptual scheme that could be
universally applied to every current and historical society. What did P ar-
sons’s structural functionalism look like? Parsons’s forte lays in his synthetic
approach which sought to explain all social phenomena within this general 
framework. For this purpose, he appropriated then-established theories 
of his predecessors2 which he used as building blocks for his new system.
Parsons preferred to view society as an integrated whole and he embraced 
the positivistic doctrine, which, however, needed to be supplemented to 
include a human aspect. A positivistic bent is especially strong in his The 
Structure of Social Action,3 which aimed to create a  coherent “positivistic
theory of action.” Here, he made extensive use of positivistic language such 
as “observations of empirical fact,” by which he understood any empirically 
verifiable statement, and stressed the importance of “logical coherence” in 
the building of theoretical systems.4 This overall positivist outlook, however,
was coupled with “voluntaristic” aspects in his theory of action – this con-
cession had to be made to include the indispensable human agent, which is 
necessary for any social theorizing.
Parsons and his collaborators later developed AGIL, a generalized four-
function conceptual scheme,5 which was to be applied across all human so-
cieties in history.6 In AGIL, he distinguished four problems that each social
2  Although he was also accused of distorting or truncating the classics.
3  Talcott Parsons, Th e Structure of Social Action (New York: McGraw Hill, 1937).
4  Ibid., 41.
5  Which has, due to its omnipresence in sociological textbooks, become more of a caricature
of itself.
6 Parsons elaborated his AGIL scheme in several works, among the most important are: 
Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a  General Th eory of Action: Th eoretical 
Foundations for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951); Talcott 
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system needs to address, and respective interrelated subsystems which have
to perform this function so that the society can survive. These were desig-
nated with the four letters A, G, I, and L, where A stands for “adaptation”
(the economic subsystem that ensures control over the environment and
production), G for “goal attainment” (the political subsystem that is respon-
sible for the collective coordination of social activities), I  for “integration”
(the normative components such as law and customs that are responsible for
societal integration) and L for “pattern maintenance” or “latent function”
(the subsystem that serves to reproduce basic principles through accultura-
tion, socialization, and education). In Parsons’s view, every society consists
of these interrelated functional subsystems that can be further analyzed,
and this scheme repeats itself on other levels too: for example, the economic
subsystem also consists of four subsystems with the same function (AGIL)
and so on. This abstract scheme can be found in all societies in human his-
tory and is thus a general theory of society.
Throughout the 50s, Parsons’s theory gained immense influence not
only in social theory but across neighboring disciplines such as economic
sociology, sociology of law and medicine. Parsons also envisioned the in-
tegration of sociology around his theory, which was further developed and
modified by his students and followers. With its rise and institutional power,
structural functionalism became the sociological mainstream, at least in the
USA.
Philosophy of science walked along the same path to a  large degree.7
Despite the fact that logical empiricism8 is rather a patchwork of approaches
than a single unified project, its gist can be briefly summarized: Grounded
in empiricism and logicism, logical empiricism should have provided a uni-
versal philosophical bedrock for all the sciences, preferably modeled on 
the most successful natural science of the day – physics. This grand vision
Parsons, Th e Social System (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951); Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, 
Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration of Economic and Social Th eory (New York: 
Routledge, 1956). Later, he presented an even more complicated and generalized system in his
human conditions paradigm. See Talcott Parsons, Action Th eory and the Human Condition
(New York: Free Press, 1978).
7  Th e story of logical empiricism and its objectives is quite well known and will not be repeated
in full here. For full account, see Ronald N. Giere and Alan W. Richardson, eds., Origins of 
Logical Empiricism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
8  I use the term “logical empiricism” in its broad sense as a blanket term for the doctrine or
movement which originated in Vienna and Berlin Circles and for their followers.
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also entailed commitments to finding a singular method of inquiry, which,
together with verificationism and reductionism, formed its core.9
Logical empiricists shared the view that there was a  possibility of 
creating a universal framework resting solely on the firm foundations of em-
pirical experience and logic, which would also do away with the burden of 
“meaningless” metaphysics. Optimists predicted that logical empiricism
would lead to a  “unified theory of knowledge,” a  fully developed base for
a future consolidation of the various sciences as to their method, language
and structure of their laws. This program was embodied in their cherished
project International Encyclopedia of Unified Science10 with its goal of 
elaborating a conceptual synthesis of science, developing a unified scientific 
language, and working out an appropriate scientific methodology.
2. Th e Demise of the Grand Th eories and Further Developments
Aft er their rise to prominence, both structural functionalism of the Parso-
nian school and logical empiricism of the Vienna and Berlin circles (later 
transplanted to the USA), began almost simultaneously to lose their ground.
Th eir shared ambition to create “grand theories” to explain society or sci-
ence in their entirety went unfulfi lled, and their programs were dismantled 
by subsequent generations of sociologists and philosophers of science, which 
ultimately led to their demise.
While in the 1950s Parsons’s hold over the field was enormous, the 
1960s painted a different picture for structural functionalism and its influ-
ence began to wane. Parsons was criticized for numerous reasons and from
diverse perspectives. In 1959, the American sociologist Mills published his 
highly influential Sociological Imagination,11 in which he warned againts the 
“traps of the grand theory”: First, the grand theory of Parsons is too general
and abstract, to the point that no theorist will ever get down to genuine
problems in the social world – the epistemic consequence of which is neither
9 More strands of logical empiricism existed that emphasized various and sometimes
incompatible features. Although the authors associated with the movement had common 
goals, they were not in full agreement about its basic tenets. For example, whereas Carnap 
professed unifi cation of scientifi c language and laws, especially in Aufb au, Neurath’s position 
in respect to the unifi ed science seems to be more reserved and he especially eschewed any 
unifi cation on the basis of a general system which might be in danger of involving metaphysics. 
Cf. Rudolf Carnap, Der logische Aufb au der Welt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1961).
10  Other activities included organizing international congresses, founding of the International 
Institute for the Unity of Science, or publication of the Journal of Unifi ed Science (Erkentniss).
11  Wright C. Mills, Th e Sociological Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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better understanding nor increased sensibility. Second, the language and
style are outdated. In Mills’s view, the grand theory is an “arid game of Con-
cepts,” “drunk on syntax, blind to semantics,” which “may not be altogether
intelligible” due to Parsons’s cumbersome writing style.12 As to the wider 
implications of such social science, Mills accused structural functionalism
of being in the service of the authorities and thus far from being a value-
free science. He also asserted that the deficiencies of Parsons’s works had
wider epistemological implications – in stressing normative and integrative
structures, Parsons’s theories lacked the means to express antagonisms and
conflicts in society and were unable to account for social change and histori-
cal development.13 By the same token, he ascribed problems with the socio-
logical grand theory to the faulty program borrowed from the philosophy 
of science which attempted to model them on the basis of natural sciences.
Mills was not alone in his attack, as similar reservations were expressed by 
Sorokin, Gouldner, Cole, and many others. “The AGIL typology did not
prove to be a very useful descriptive taxonomy, and it is virtually impossible
to identify how its development enabled us to understand any particular
social phenomenon or outcome,” writes Cole in his sweeping rebuttal.14
It goes without saying that many of the critical points leveled against
structural functionalism held well for logical empiricism too. The move-
ment15 found its early vocal critic in Popper, who did not share its views on
the scientific method, the role of metaphysics and other crucial issues.16 But 
Popper’s major work Logik der Forschung (1935), which provided much am-
munition against logical empiricism, did not appear in English translation
until 1959 as The Logic of Scientific Discovery,17 so its impact was delayed, at
12  Ibid., 26–34.
13  Perhaps, not surprisingly, Mills was also pessimistic about science in general when he
expressed open dislike for scientism and viewed the modern natural sciences as a  highly 
ambiguous enterprise. Ibid., 16.
14 Stephen Cole, “Why Sociology Does not Make Progress like the Natural Sciences,”
Sociological Forum 9, no. 2 (1994): 133–54, 140.
15  Logical empiricism had its own rich history of fall-outs with philosophical community.
Th e core of the project also ran counter to other strands of continental philosophy, especially 
Heidegger’s metaphysics, to which it directly responded.
16  Popper’s falsifi cationism is in many points similar to the views of logical empiricists,
especially in its reliance on one single principle that guides scientifi c method, and on those
grounds, it can also be included in the family of grand theories of science. For that reason,
much of the later criticism was equally valid both for logical empiricism and Popper’s
falsifi cationism.
17 Karl R. Popper, Th e Logic of Scientifi c Discovery (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1959).
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least in the English speaking world. In the 1950s and early 1960s, Popper was
soon joined by a host of others: Quine, Hanson, Feyerabend, and Kuhn,18
all of whom found many weaknesses in the edifice of logical empiricism
and helped to undermine its position in the philosophy of science. In the
eyes of these authors, logical empiricism was deficient mainly because of its
inability to account for scientific dynamics and change. It was blamed for
providing only a  false, static image of science that cannot account for the
representation of scientific development or activity. All in all, the demise
of the movement in the philosophical community occurred sometime be-
tween the publication of Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism19 (1951) and
Kuhn’s Structure (1962), as Friedman asserts.20 Especially detrimental for 
logical empiricism proved to be the publication of Kuhn’s oeuvre, the impact
of which cannot be overestimated – Kuhn questioned (although did not
directly attack) nearly all the basic tenets of logical empiricism. He single-
handedly undercut its prospects for a grand unification theory and showed
that the simplifying account of science as a purely rational enterprise had to
be supplemented with a new kind of inquiry. Kuhn and his followers put an
emphasis on the historical and sociological setting in which any scientific
knowledge is produced and broke the ground for an entirely new era. Kuhn
decidedly proved that these factors hold epistemological significance and
cannot be simply shunted off outside the realm of science as the logical
empiricists had attempted.
From this perspective, the criticism of structural functionalism and log-
ical empiricism often converged because they share a similar blind spot – the
inability to account fully for the dynamics or conflicts in society or science.
As a result, both doctrines came to an impasse and were in their original
form discontinued – the structural functionalists suffered substantial ne-
glect in the academic community and publications of the logical empiricists’
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science21 came to a halt. So, the raison 
18  Ironically, Kuhn’s Structure was published as a volume of the International Encyclopedia 
of Unifi ed Science (Volumes I–II: Foundations of the Unity of Science). Rather surprisingly,
Carnap and others did not consider it an attack on their project and the Structure has not
become a topic for discussion, since they considered it a work in the history of science and
not in the philosophy of science. See Th omas S. Kuhn, Th e Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
19  William V. O. Quine, “Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Th e 
Philosophical Review 60, no. 1 (1951): 20–43.
20 Michael Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 1.
21  Kuhn’s Structure had only one successor.
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d’être for such all-encompassing projects waned, and the disciplines took 
a different course in general. Both doctrines were soon, in quite graphic lan-
guage, pronounced dead: “Who now reads Parsons?” asks Bryant22 on behalf 
of sociologists. “Logical positivism, then, is dead, or as dead as a philosophi-
cal movement ever becomes,” wrote Passmore in his obituary.23
At this point, the fate of the two disciplines came into direct contact
as the course of events in social sciences was impacted by the turmoil in
the philosophy of science and vice versa. Kuhn and his followers drew more
attention to the role of social practices in the natural sciences,24 but this 
tide has impacted the social sciences with even greater intensity in return,
as they are more vulnerable to all kinds of external factors and pressures.
Next, their objectivity was put in question, their status as a science began to
erode, and further marginalization in academia as well as lowered trust of 
the public followed.25 Furthermore, this disciplinary conflict did not remain
confined to the walls of academia but had a wider societal impact, since the 
seminal texts (which also became bestsellers) of Mills, Kuhn or Fayerabend
appealed to the broader public and these iconoclasts, albeit unintentionally,
became the standard-bearers for the 1960s revolt. All in all, the 1960s meant
the ultimate death knell for the grand theories.
In spite of the fact that nothing is labelled structural functionalism or
logical empiricism anymore,26 the story does not end there. Looking back, 
claims of their death seem far-fetched because in the 1980s both doctrines
experienced a mild resurrection, and, on top of that, they were partly assimi-
lated into other paradigms and thus remained part of the disciplines’ legacy.
In sociology, Parsons’s pupils tried to save his kind of theorizing, one
example of this being Merton with his proposal of middle-range theories
which stand between the macrolevel – the holistic theory of society – and the
22  Christopher G. A. Bryant, “Review Article: Who Now Reads Parsons?,” Th e Sociological 
Review 31, no. 2 (1983), 337–49.
23 John Passmore, “Logical Positivism,” in Th e Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume V, ed. Paul
Edwards (New York: MacMillan and the Free Press, 1967), 52–57.
24  Later exacerbated by Feyerabend with his staunch criticism and sometimes vitriolic charges
against science itself.
25  See, e.g., Joseph Lopreato and Timothy Crippen, Crisis in Sociology: Th e Need for Darwin
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999).
26  Alan Richardson, “‘Th at Sort of Everyday Image of Logical Positivism’: Th omas Kuhn
and the Decline of Logical Empiricist Philosophy of Science,” in Th e Cambridge Companion 
to Logical Empiricism, eds. Alan Richardson and Th omas Uebel (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), 346–70. 
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microlevel of empirical research.27 And although little development occurred 
under the rubric of structural functionalism later, Parsonian sociology sur-
vived and was absorbed into the works of Alexander (neo-functionalism),
Giddens, Barber, Münch and other general theorists, that – according
to some voices – even superseded Parsons’s work itself. So, Parsons never
went away completely and the 1980s saw a  reappraisal and restoration of 
his legacy, mostly based on the merits of his extensive elaboration of many 
sociologically relevant topics.28
In the philosophy of science, logical empiricism never ceased to exist 
completely and was integrated into various strands of analytical philosophy 
or the philosophy of science (constructive empiricism,29 or naturalism), with 
which it shared some basic commitments. At the same time its heritage 
received more favorable treatment by some authors, who valued its worthy 
features such as logical precision.
Despite this reappraisal, the overall impact and epistemic consequences 
of this demise were profound. In the 1960s at the latest, it was apparent that 
the disciplines were unable to find common ground either in methodology 
or theory. The impossibility of reducing them into a unified basis carried 
along the message that plurality would be likely to reign in the future.
In sociology, new schools and paradigms strove to secure their spot 
under the sun: in addition to critical sociology, these included phenom-
enological sociology, social constructionism, and others that brought new 
directions and methods, in which subjective perception and everyday reality 
assumed a privileged spot in the research.
In the philosophy of science, developments led away from logical 
empiricism in other directions, too – the “new philosophy of science,”30
such as the “sociology of scientific knowledge” or “science and technology 
27  A similar tendency for a mesolevel of inquiry was echoed in the history of science as well, for
example by Galison, who called for a “mesoscopic“ history, located between the universalizing
history of scientifi c instrumentation and a particular history of one scientifi c artefact. Peter 
Galison, Image and Logic. A Material Culture of Microphysics (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1997), 61–63.
28 A nuanced view of Parsons, his achievements, and reception of his work can be found in
Roland Robertson and Bryan S. Turner, Talcott Parsons: Th eorist of Modernity (London: Sage 
Publications, 1991).
29  Bas C. van Fraassen, Th e Scientifi c Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
30  Th eodore Kisiel and Galen Johnson, “New Philosophies of Science in the USA: A Selective 
Survey,” Zeitschrift  für allgemeine Wissenschaft stheorie / Journal for General Philosophy of 
Science 5, no. 1 (1974): 138–91.
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studies,” started to gain ground. Walking in Kuhn’s footsteps, they stressed
discontinuity more than stability and adumbrated brand-new research top-
ics. Philosophers, historians, sociologists and ethnographers of science31
set out to study the changes, ruptures, and crises instead of analyzing the
logical structure of scientific theories which had been in focus in previous
decades.
3. Incommensurable Disciplines?
Th e lesson learned from the collapse of the unifi cation attempts was that
various paradigms, schools, or theories were mutually incommensurable
and would have to co-exist synchronistically both in sociology and in the 
philosophy of science. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the community of 
practitioners openly or implicitly acknowledged this fact and pluralistic ten-
dencies started to take root in each of the disciplines. Th is has become more
or less the accepted status quo, particularly during the postmodern period
in the 1980s and early 1990s – although hegemonistic tendencies never quite
ceased to exist, as many battles among various factions fought over the years
attest. Yet, the plurality issue was ushered in long before, as I  will briefl y 
show in the following paragraphs.
Already in the 1930s, Sorokin, one of the founding fathers of sociol-
ogy, became a harbinger of the “pluralistic spell,” as he aptly observed that
the discipline is “overcrowded by a multitude of various and contradictory 
systems.” However, at the same time, he optimistically added that among
these theories valid ones can be selected and the rest weeded out – a task that
he set for himself.32
Also, under later theorists, this kind of sociological metatheorizing
flourished. They came up with a number of classifications of sociology, but
at the same time often lamented over the state of the discipline. Ritzer,33
drawing on Kuhn, offered a tripartite categorization of sociology, where the
paradigms of social facts, social definitions, and social behavior competed.
31 Since this period, it would be more appropriate to speak about “studies of science” in general
because the boundaries between the philosophy of science and the other above-mentioned
fi elds began to dissolve rapidly from the late 60s.
32  Pitirim A. Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Th eories (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1928), xix. Sorokin himself later updated his original schema in the 1960s.
33 George Ritzer, “Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science,” Th e American Sociologist 10, no. 3 




He also noticed that these paradigms had ambitions to explain social phe-
nomena with a  general theory and thus to ascend to hegemony, and that
they often spread – along with Kuhn’s findings – not based on scientific
merits but on the institutional power that their supporters held. At the time
of publication, Ritzer was still hopeful that integration was possible, but
nothing like that happened. But soon it was quite clear that the old Comtean
dream which conceived of sociology as a unified science (“social physics”)
would never come to fruition, as it could not be successfully based either on
a positivistic paradigm nor on any other.
Later a number of others became affiliated with these views: Holmwood 
and Stewart wrote about a widespread malaise in sociology, especially re-
garding the prospects of an integrated general theory, which have not yet
been developed, and there has been a perception among social theorists that
such undertakings were futile and impossible.34 Turner saw “a hyperdiffer-
entiation of theories” which were to coexist as their unification was nowhere
in sight because sociologists do not agree on what the core problems or epis-
temology should be.35 Also Abbott fully acknowledged this: “The discipline
is rather like a caravansary on the Silk Road, filled with all sorts and types
of people and beset by bandit gangs of positivists, feminists, interactionists,
and Marxists, and even by some larger, far-off states like Economics and the
Humanities, all of whom are bent on reducing the place to vassalage.”36 Last 
but not least, Levine diagnosed the state of sociology as “muted disquiet,”
pointing to its fragmentation, the end of grand narratives akin to natural
sciences, and weakened disciplinary boundaries. And sociology was not the
only field affected. Levine extended his claim to the rest of the social sci-
ences – among them anthropology, psychology, economics, political science,
and even history, and juxtaposed it with the optimism that had pervaded
these disciplines just a few decades earlier.37
The philosophy of science (or the studies of science) has given itself 
over to this kind of metatheorizing too, when it was apparent after the
34  John Holmwood and Alexander Stewart, “Synthesis and Fragmentation in Social Th eory:
A  Progressive Solution,” Sociological Th eory 12, no. 1 (1994). Despite their rather dim 
description of the situation, Holmwood and Stewart still retained some hope for future
integration.
35  Jonathan H. Turner, “Sociological Th eory Today,” in Handbook of Sociological Th eory, 
ed. Jonathan H. Turner (New York: Springer, 2001).
36  Andrew D. Abbott, Chaos of Disciplines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 6.




Kuhnian revolt that logical positivism as an “ultimate” theory of science
had failed. This question was raised seriously by Lakatos, who, in the early 
1970s, broached the topic of multiple theories (“methodologies”) of science,
when he explicitly admitted that: “There are several methodologies afloat in
contemporary philosophy of science” (inductivism, conventionalism, falsi-
ficationism, and his own methodology of scientific research programmes).38
Here the actual scope of the methodologies or theories of science39 was not
important, but Lakatos exposed the fact that the discipline was thrown out
of kilter by the existence of several rival theories of science which could not
be unified under a common banner by the community of philosophers.40
Another such admission came from Laudan in the mid-1970s as a part
of his attempt to improve Lakatos’s proposal.41 Laudan, too, acknowledged 
that there were “numerous rival philosophical accounts” of the scientific
methods and theories. Unlike Lakatos’s, his metacriterion employed empiri-
cal tests against the archetypal cases in the history of science performed by 
the consensual judgment of the philosophers of science, who were to decide
which of the rival methodologies were erroneous based on “pre-analytic
intuitions about scientific rationality.”42 However, Giere found later both
these metamethodologies circular and put forth yet another proposal of 
metacriterion grounded in an evolutionary perspective coupled with cogni-
tive science as a way out.43
38 Imre Lakatos, “Th e Methodology of Scientifi c Research Programmes,” in Philosophical 
Papers, Volume I, eds. John Worrall and Gregory Currie (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978), 103.
39  Lakatos also interchangeably uses throughout his text the terms “logics of discovery,”
“systems of appraisal,” “theories of scientifi c rationality,” and “defi nitions of science” for the
“systems of rules of the scientifi c game,” as proposed by the diff erent philosophers of science.
All of them can be understood “as historiographical (or meta-historical) theories (or research
programmes).” Ibid., 102–3.
40 As is well-known, Lakatos tried to solve the problem by applying his “metacriterion“
(“methodology of scientifi c research programmes of second order”) to the existing theories
and methodologies of science which sought to maintain the impersonal rationality of the
selection process at the same time. Perhaps it is hardly surprising that his own “methodology 
of scientifi c research programmes” scored best when tested. Ibid., 132.
41  Laudan’s initial proposal can be found in the fi ft h chapter of his Progress. See Larry Laudan,
Progress and Its Problems: Toward a  Th eory of Scientifi c Growth (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977). Later, he discussed the topic, albeit with a diff erent outcome. See Larry 
Laudan, “Some Problems Facing Intuitionist Meta-Methodologies Source,” Synthese 67, no. 1 
(1986).
42  Laudan, Progress, 160.




Therefore, despite these new steps towards unification, the discipline 
has continued to disintegrate due to strong centrifugal forces and has not
displayed any tendency towards a universally accepted solution. It has be-
come apparent that the philosophy of science (or the studies of science) will
remain divided and assume a “multiparadigmatic” character. This situation
continues up to this day, as the philosophy of science harbors an abundance
of schools, paradigms, philosophies, and specialisations with several axes
of differentiations. This break-up and disunity were noted by Worrall, who
considers the contemporary philosophy of science a “rich and multi-faceted
enterprise” in which no single view is possible.44 Similarly, Machamer45
found it splintered into separate sub-fields such as the philosophy of physics,
biology, chemistry, medicine, and economics on the one hand, and science
studies on the other – and both of these accompanied by specialized sub-
disciplines such as practical medical ethics.46
The picture in the previous paragraphs may be too brief to capture 
the subtleties and checkered past of sociology and the philosophy of sci-
ence, but the simplification notwithstanding, the incommensurability of 
frameworks truly reflects the persistent problems besetting both disciplines.
Longstanding dilemmas and unhealed rifts have resulted in a deep lack of 
unity that affects the workings of these disciplines, their status in academia
and even their perception in the public. At present, neither of the disci-
plines has a common method or core knowledge with which the majority 
of their practitioners would identify and approve of. As Seidman describes
the situation for sociology: “Unfortunately, theorists have been unable to
achieve anything approaching consensus on the core premises, concepts,
.
44  John Worrall, “Philosophy of Science: Classic Debates, Standard Problems, Future Pros-
pects,” in Th e Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science, eds. Peter K. Machamer and Mi-
chael Silberstein (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 18–36.
45 Peter Machamer, “A  Brief Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science,” in Th e 
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science, eds. Peter K. Machamer and Michael Silberstein
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002).
46  Also, Radder, for instance, joined the chorus when he pointed to the “increasing specializa-
tion” and “fragmentation” with prevailing interdisciplinary approaches and several faultlines
as characteristics of the discipline. Cf. Hans Radder, “What Prospects for a General Philoso-
phy of Science?,” Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift  für allgemeine Wissen-
schaft stheorie 43, no. 1 (2012), 89–92.
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and explanatory models of social knowledge.”47 A statement that holds for 
philosophy of science as well.
The absence of a common method or core knowledge means that there
is no shared basis on which the disciplines can be built. As a consequence,
sociology and the philosophy of science both now live in a state of continu-
ous unrest, in which incommensurable approaches are forced to co-exist.
This pluralistic outcome has also put further in question their epistemic
standing and significance, which has always been somewhat precarious.
How is it possible to rely on them when even the practitioners are not able to
reach agreement or produce objective knowledge? Why is it that the disci-
plines have found themselves in such a trap? And do the social sciences48 and 
philosophy o f science and related fields share the same dim predicament?
4. Why Is It So? Natural and Social Worlds
When trying to uncover why plurality reigns instead of unity, we can clearly 
identify some of the multifold ontological and epistemic reasons. Some of 
them were already spelled out in detail in the classical works of Hayek49 and 
Popper50, who addressed the distinction between “physical” and “social”
facts, and also warned against blind reliance on positivistic, rationalistic
or naturalistic methodologies in the studies of society or science. Neither
discipline in particular should neglect the unpredictability of the “human
factor” or the “growth of human knowledge,” they cautioned.51
Many of these points can be illuminated by the distinctions between
exact sciences that study natural phenomena and “soft” sciences that study 
phenomena with any social component. Although these distinctions cannot
be dissected in detail here, we can determine several features that are sali-
47 Steven Seidman, Contested Knowledge: Social Th eory Today (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 
2013), 2.
48  We can extend our analysis to the social sciences in general since the following points
concern all social sciences.
49 Friedrich Hayek, Th e Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason (Glencoe:
Free Press, 1952).
50  Karl R. Popper, Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge, 1957).
51 Later, authors such as Cole et al., addressed the issue of why sociology is not as successful
qua science, cf. Stephen Cole, ed., What’s Wrong with Sociology? (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2001). Especially, Cole’s “Introduction” and fi rst chapter “Why Sociology Doesn’t
Make Progress like the Natural Sciences.” Cole names as one of the reasons the diffi  culty of 
“establish[ing] facts” in sociological research compared to any natural science (especially if 
they run contrary to some particular ideological beliefs held by sociologists).
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ent for the relative success of the natural sciences as compared to the social
sciences:
1. Unlike the natural world, the social world is much more complex –
whereas a natural phenomenon can be described by a handful of uni-
versal laws, a social phenomenon resists such an easy description.
2. Add a lack of controlled experiments – in the natural sciences, the re-
searcher usually works in controlled laboratory conditions, whereas in 
the social sciences such full control of the research object is much more 
diffi  cult to obtain, or excluded altogether for various reasons.
3. At least some social phenomena tend to have multiple causes, so in social
sciences establishing causal-links can be challenging.
4. Th e transience of social phenomena causes their high mutability across
time and space.
5. One of the peculiarities of the investigation of human and social behav-
ior is the notorious interplay between reality and its theoretical descrip-
tion. Merton’s “self-fulfi lling prophecy,” “refl exivity” in sociology or 
“performativity” in economics reveal that fully independent analysis in 
these disciplines is almost impossible to achieve.
6. Related to this is the “observer eff ect” which usually prevents the re-
searcher from studying social phenomena “objectively” without aff ect-
ing them.52
7. Last but not least, the social sciences are never value-free and are always
prone to intervention from “external infl uences” of any kind, which re-
moves them even further from the ideal of objective science and makes 
any consensus among social scientists diffi  cult to obtain.
Likewise, the philosophy of science (and all the disciplines studying 
science) face similar problems. Both formalized theories of science of the
positivistic bent and empirical theories of scientific evolution or develop-
ment find themselves in the same predicament as the social sciences. The
phenomena under study are so complex that formulations of any (logical or
empirical) “laws” are notoriously difficult. Aside from all the reasons cited
above, “serendipidity” is a prominent factor which makes the search for any 
discernible patterns in scientific activities quite challenging. This is why all
52 Th e “observer eff ect” is, of course, not restricted to social sciences, but its presence in micro-




the ambitious projects – be it the grand vision of logical empiricists, later
theories of scientific change, or cognitive models of science53 – have not lived 
up to their promise as unifying frameworks.
All these basic ontological and epistemological obstacles prevent the
disciplines that study highly complex phenomena such as society54 or science
from becoming as successful as the natural sciences. The acknowledgement
of this simple fact and its implications should be the point of departure for
every social scientist or philosopher of science. But this is not the case, as we
will see.
5. Th e Eternal Dreaming of a Grand Th eory
I believe my account has suffi  ciently established that creating an overarch-
ing, universally shared framework or theory for complex phenomena such
as society or science is impossible. Given this, it is therefore surprising that
a number of social scientists or philosophers of science still keep trying to
advance their own versions of grand theories, frameworks, or narratives (or
at least plans thereof).
Already in the mid-1980s Skinner55 argued that in many fields grand
theories had been making a comeback, after they had almost disappeared
from the scene. He pointed out that Mills, Kuhn and the likes only cleared
the way for new grand theories (sometimes in disguise) that came to occupy 
their place. And there seems to be a certain justification to this claim. A can-
didate to fill the void seemed to be the Giddens’ structuration theory,56 and
53 Cf., e.g., Ronald N. Giere, “Introduction,” in Cognitive Models of Science, Minnesota Studies 
in Philosophy of Science, ed. Ronald N. Giere (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1992), xv–xxviii.
54  Clearly, the points that I made earlier are not restricted to sociology. Economics, for exam-
ple, is considered the most exact social science, but it is beset by the same problems arising
from the complexity of social reality. Here, typically, simple laws can be formulated, such as 
supply-demand theory, which are seemingly immutable. However, they also hold only under
ceteris paribus conditions when other variables are stable. But this is seldom the case in any 
society, because social, political, ideological, psychological, or other variables intervene. Th us,
ceteris paribus as the condition sine qua non for economic theories, reveals the simplifi cations
of a complex reality. In the popular discourse, which nevertheless has a strong theoretical un-
derpinning, this is acknowledged in “black swan” theories, which show clearly that economic
subsystem cannot be separated from other outer events. 
55  Quentin Skinner, “Introduction,” in Th e Return of Grand Th eory in the Human Sciences
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1–20.
56  Anthony Giddens, Th e Constitution of Society. Outline of the Th eory of Structuration.
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1984).
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his successors Archer and Mouzelis,57 but there were also other pretenders
such as Habermas, Bourdieu, or Alexander,58 who sought to reconcile the
existing rifts and provide a general theory of a sort. Theoreticians such as
Turner and Boyns59 maintain that “the micro-meso-macro linkage problem”
is the main obstacle standing in the way to the desirable return of a grand
theory, and in overcoming it they see a way ahead that should prevent both
the overspecialization and the decline of the status of sociology.60
Among these attempts, we can also count some more recent trends –
relational or analytical sociology. Though more sober, and aware of the
fate of the previous grand theories, some of these contemporary theorists
still aspire to exactly the kind of unification that was promised by previous
grand theorists. Relational sociology61 shifts the attention to the dynamic
and processual side in the description of social reality with a view toward
reworking the existing key sociological general concepts on all levels
(macro-, meso-, micro) from the relational viewpoint. To support this ex-
tensive claim, Vandenberghe speaks about “a single framework” that would
“systematically integrate the concepts of the field” into a “general relational
social theory.”62 On a related note, analytical sociology has been trying to 
establish social mechanisms (“social cogs and wheels”) as universal axioms 
through which social facts should be explained (Hedströ m, Manzo, etc.).63
But these attempts patently face the same obstacles as all the previous ones
57 Margaret Archer, Realist Social Th eory: Th e Morphogenetic Approach (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1995); Nicos Mouzelis, Sociological Th eory: What Went Wrong? Diag-
nosis and Remedies (London: Routledge, 1995).
58 Axel Van den Berg, “Is Sociological Th eory Too Grand for Social Mechanisms?,” in Social 
Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Th eory, eds. Peter Hedström and Richard
Swedberg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
59  Jonathan H. Turner and David E. Boyns, “Th e Return of Grand Th eory,” in Handbook of 
Sociological Th eory, ed. Jonathan H. Turner (New York: Springer, 2001).
60  Other such proposal was Ritzer’s call for an “integrated paradigm,” which sought to
reconcile the micro and the macro level theories. See George Ritzer, Explorations in Social 
Th eory: From Metatheorizing to Rationalization (London: Sage Publications, 2001).
61  Cf. Mustafa Emirbayer, “Manifesto for a  Relational Sociology,” Th e American Journal of 
Sociology 103, no. 2 (1997); François Dé pelteau, ed., Th e Palgrave Handbook of Relational 
Sociology (Cham: Springer, 2018).
62  Frédéric Vandenberghe, “Th e Relation as Magical Operator: Overcoming the Divide Be-
tween Relational and Processual Sociology,” in Th e Palgrave Handbook of Relational Sociology, 
ed. François Dé pelteau (Cham: Springer, 2018), 37.
63  Cf. Peter Hedströ m and Peter Bearman, eds., Th e Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1–17; Gianluca Manzo, ed., Analytical Sociology:
Actions and Networks (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2014). 
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– they just select one mode of description and explanation over another, and
there is hardly a chance that they would be promoted into a standard general 
framework or social theory that would be commonly agreed upon.
In the philosophy of science, the developments of the 1960s also only 
superficially dispensed with grand theories. Following sociology, Kuhn’s
paradigms – as well as Lakatos’s research programmes, Laudan’s research
traditions, Toulmin’s evolutionary epistemology64 and other theories – suc-
cessfully filled the void left by logical empiricism and enriched the discipline
with accounts of scientific change that did justice to its dynamics and con-
tingent nature. However, these new theories construed their own holistic
and universal frameworks which came with shortcomings not dissimilar to
the ones found in older theories.
Later, in the 21st century philosophy of science, the call to arms has not
ceased either. Psillos,65 despite his acknowledgement of “the collapse of the
macro-models of science,” brings back to life the essentialist claims about the
existence of a “science in general” which should lend itself to analysis by a gen-
eral philosophy of science. Further, in his programmatic piece, Psillos also at-
tempts to defy the disintegration tendencies in the philosophy of science in the
past decades and wants to create “a new synthesis within general philosophy of 
science” that would encompass its constitutive and historical elements.
A  more extensive attempt was undertaken by Barseghyan.66 Again, 
Barseghyan is aware of the atomized state of the discipline, in which there
is no consensus as to the characteristics of a general theory or the criteria
that it should satisfy, but is nevertheless committed to overcoming these
odds.67 He thinks that the development of science is a  law governed pro-
cess, which leads him to the conclusion that “a general descriptive theory of 
64  Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).
65  Psillos again argues in favor of a general theory of science. His text is conceived as a reply to
Kitcher, who is equally skeptical about the possibility of a general theory on similar grounds
as those presented in my article. See Stathis Psillos, “What is General Philosophy of Science?,” 
Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift  für allgemeine Wissenschaft stheorie 43, 
no. 1 (2012): 93–103; Stathis Psillos, “Having Science in View: General Philosophy of Science 
and its Signifi cance,” in Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, ed. Paul Humphreys 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Cf. Philip Kitcher, “Toward a Pragmatist Philosophy 
of Science,” Th eoria 77 (2013): 185–231.
66 Barseghyan dubbed the new venture a “scientonomy,” which he considers to be “an academic
discipline” with “two major branches – theoretical scientonomy and observational scienton-
omy.” As of 2019, the scientonomic community already has its own journal (Scientonomy),
encyclopedia, seminars, and conferences, etc.
67  Hakob Barseghyan, Th e Laws of Scientifi c Change (Cham: Springer, 2015), xiv.
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scientific change (TSC)” is not only “theoretically possible” but also “practi-
cally achievable.”68 Thus, his work aims at exactly that – establishing the 
foundations that would explain the mechanisms of scientific change both
in theories and methods.69 His theory is built in an axiomatic fashion, with 
“axioms,” “theorems,” and “laws” comprising the body of the theory which
is accompanied by a metatheoretical warrant. All these and other attempts70
are necessarily exposed to the same critical arguments that have been raised
before.
Apparently, neither current social scientists nor philosophers of science 
seem immune to the lure of grand theorizing (or narrativizing), and they still
assume that some sort of a general doctrine or framework can be constructed.
Perhaps the main lesson to be learned from the disciplines’ history is 
not that these frameworks cannot be created, or that they would be wrong,
but that they can be supplied in unlimited numbers – as society and science
can be modeled in myriads of ways.
Of course, there is still a theoretical possibility of such frameworks, but 
it would not be, in my opinion, based on current theories or a combination
thereof, as none of them seems to be equipped to serve this purpose.
But why is it then that practitioners still harbor such hopes and keep 
churning out their theories, or at least proposals for them? Abbott71 offers 
an interesting sociological explanation, which is dialectical (Hegelian) in
nature.72 According to him, the reason is the natural dynamics of sociology,
in which every new generation must inevitably compete for attention, rec-
ognition, and resources with the “old guard.” To prove itself in the academic
world the new generation has to uproot the old idols, and erect their own
deities instead, as a part of normal generational exchange.73 This cyclical de-
68  Ibid., xiii.
69  Ibid., xiv.
70  Th ere are more examples like this, e.g., Luk’s proposal for a  “process model of scientifi c 
study” or a “theory of scientifi c study.” Cf. Robert W. P. Luk, “Understanding Scientifi c Study 
via Process Modeling,” Foundations of Science 15, no. 1 (2010): 49–78; and Robert W. P. Luk,
“A Th eory of Scientifi c Study,” Foundations of Science 22, no. 1 (2017): 11–38.
71 Abbott, Chaos, xvi.
72  Another comprehensive treatment of the rules of intellectual life is presented in Randall
Collins, Th e Sociology of Philosophies: A  Global Th eory of Intellectual Change (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 2000).
73  Abbott illustrates this process using Parsons (thesis) and his successors (anthithesis). 
Another example is a constant revamping of the idea of “social constructivism.” Ibid., 17–18.
By the way, it is also worth noting that some of the features of Abbott’s theory (such as self-
similarity) closely resemble Parsons’s own ideas (subsystems).
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velopment is – as Abbott somehow cynically reflects – often accompanied by 
fierce struggles between newcomers and orthodoxy in academic structures.
But during this process (which concerns not only theories but also
methods), even novices often do no more than rediscover the wheel, for they 
merely “recontextualize” old ideas and bring them back under new names,
and this fact further undermines the credibility and standing of the disci-
plines. Besides sociology proper, Abbott extended his claim to the sociology 
of science as well, where the tradition of putting “old wine in new bottles”
also took root. 74
We can see Abbott’s ideas at work, for example, in social theory in
which the fortunes of “agency” and “structure” perpetually shift, or in cur-
rent analytical sociology which successfully rehashes the strategies of the
mechanistic and biological schools in sociology by borrowing concepts and
models from other sciences.
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